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Executive Summary 
 
Despite the outpourings of billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of troops over 
the last eight years, many Afghans are angry and resentful at the international presence in 
Afghanistan. This reflects a growing divide between the perceptions of the Western 
public and policymakers and those of Afghan citizens about the intentions and 
accomplishments of international forces in Afghanistan. For the Western public, the 
international community is in Afghanistan to stabilize the government and stop the spread 
of terrorism. Western policymakers tend to act on the assumptions that the Taliban, Al 
Qaeda, and other insurgents bear the greatest responsibility for civilian casualties; and 
that international forces are in Afghanistan to improve the situation.  
 
In dozens of individual interviews and focus groups conducted by the Open Society 
Foundations with partner nongovernmental organizations in late 2009 and 2010, Afghans 
repeatedly called into question the truisms held by the international community and 
Western policymakers. Incidents of civilian casualties, night raids, wrongful or abusive 
detentions, deteriorating security, and the perceived impunity of international forces have 
generated negative stereotypes of international forces as violent, abusive, and sometimes, 
deliberately malevolent in their conduct and nature.  
 
While statistics show that insurgents are responsible for most civilian casualties, many 
we interviewed accused international forces of directly stoking the conflict and causing as 
many, if not more, civilian casualties than the insurgents. Many were even suspicious that 
international forces were directly or indirectly supporting insurgents. These suspicions, in 
turn, have fed into broader shifts toward framing international forces as occupiers, rather 
than as a benefit to Afghanistan. Today, each incident of abuse, whether caused by 
international forces or insurgents, reinforces these negative perceptions and further 
undermines any remaining Afghan trust.   
 
International actors often dismiss these perceptions as being based on rumors, conspiracy 
theories, propaganda, or bad analysis.  However, many of these perceptions seemed based 
as much on actual policies—albeit often due to indirect effects—as on propaganda or 
lack of information.  Many Afghan communities drew these conclusions only after they 
suffered from civilian casualties, night raids, detention operations, and saw few signs of 
progress in their country.  
 
Suspicion and resentment of the international military is also often dismissed as a product 
of Afghanistan’s history. Commentators often voice the assumption that such views 
would be part of Afghan relations with any outside power, or alternately that these views 
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are only endorsed by select political groups, tribes, or ethnicities—particularly those who 
are Taliban sympathizers. While it is true that there are delicate ethnic dimensions that 
buttress negative perceptions, such as a history of Pashtuns regularly defending their 
lands from intruding foreign forces, negative perceptions of international forces and 
suspicion about the international community are broadly accepted across much of 
Afghanistan. In the course of this research, the Open Society Foundations found few 
meaningful differences in perceptions of international forces, regardless of the ethnicity 
of the Afghans interviewed, their level of education, political affiliation, or proximity to 
conflict. Those with staunch pro-government or pro-Western views, and those belonging 
to regions or groups that have benefited the most in the post-Taliban period also 
expressed negative attitudes toward the international community, and international forces 
in particular.  
 
Western policymakers have recently recognized that civilian casualties, detention 
operations, and other activities that harm Afghan communities have engendered distrust 
and anger, undermining overall success in Afghanistan. Overcoming Afghan resentment 
toward international forces and the Afghan government has been a key concern in the 
new counterinsurgency strategy, and recent policies have reduced civilian casualties, 
improved detention conditions, and increased strategic communications in an attempt to 
win Afghan “hearts and minds.” Yet these policy reforms have often been too little, too 
late. Any policy aimed at rebuilding the trust and confidence of Afghan communities 
must take into account how to mitigate both the direct and indirect effects of the 
international community’s actions in Afghanistan. It must also consider the build up of 
mistrust and grievances from the past nine years of conflict. 
 
By dismissing Afghan perceptions of the international community as propaganda or 
conspiracy theories alone, policymakers have often failed to understand how much these 
negative perceptions may be distorting their policies and efforts. The international 
community needs the trust and cooperation of Afghan communities for many of its most 
crucial policies to succeed, including counterinsurgency initiatives, strengthening 
governance and rule of law, and reconciliation and reintegration. Past civilian casualties, 
night raids, and detention operations have not only deeply angered Afghans; they have 
negatively shaped the way Afghans view foreigners, and have the potential to stymie the 
success of both short- and long-term policy initiatives in Afghanistan. 
 
With the international community fighting an uphill battle against Afghan perceptions, 
the following recommendations would allow foreign policymakers and military officials 
to make inroads toward establishing the trust and cooperation with Afghans that has been 
lost due to civilian casualties, night raids, detention operations, insecurity, and lack of 
accountability: 
• Recognize the causes and importance of Afghan community narratives, rather 
than dismissing them out of hand as conspiracy theories, propaganda, or tribal 
bias. 
• Institute changes for broader transparency and responsiveness by international 
forces to allegations—both past and present—of misconduct against Afghans. 
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Such allegations must be taken seriously, and result in meaningful investigations 
and disciplinary procedures. The results should then be communicated directly to 
affected individuals or communities.  
• Reaffirm and extend the recent military tactical and policy changes that have 
reduced the potential for civilian harm by international troops and continue to 
provide greater protections for those detained in the conflict. 
• Stop the increased use of night raids as the primary kill/capture mechanism. Every 
night raid should be scrutinized prior to its approval as to why it must be 
conducted during the night and why more traditional law enforcement safeguards 
for neutralizing suspects are not appropriate or possible. 
• Exercise greater political accountability over Special Operations and non-military 
forces engaged in night raids and related operations. 
• Reconsider the new counterinsurgency strategy of pushing international troops 
closer to villagers until the population can be meaningfully protected from the 
increased insurgent violence, collateral damage from international forces, and 
broader humanitarian consequences that often accompany such troop movements. 
• Exercise caution regarding initiatives that arm, train, or otherwise empower local 
militias. Past attempts have often resulted in the unintended side effects of 
empowering local warlords, leading to abuses of power, inflaming tribal rivalries, 
indirectly supporting insurgent groups, and otherwise feeding the conflict.  
In addition, there are important steps that the Afghan government can take to ensure that 
the consequences of conflict for their communities are not forgotten. The international 
community should work with the Afghan government to:  
 
• Ensure that any reconciliation talks include a transitional justice mechanism that 
acknowledges the suffering of the victims and helps Afghan communities address 
past grievances.  
• Establish a public, national registry for victims of conflict that will publish not 
only the number of casualties caused by the ongoing conflict, but also account for 
the cause of death, and those believed to be responsible. An Afghan institution 
with some degree of independence from all warring parties should be charged 
with this responsibility. 
 
 
* * * 
 
This brief is the second in a series by the Open Society Foundations Regional Policy Initiative on 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Regional Policy Initiative was developed to examine key policy issues in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, including civilian casualties and conflict-related detentions. The Open Society 
Foundations are a network of nongovernmental organizations that work to build vibrant and tolerant 
democracies whose governments are accountable to their citizens. On a local level, the Open Society 
Afghanistan implements a range of initiatives to advance justice, education, public health, and independent 
media.  
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“Even a seven year old child hates the foreign military because of their activities. Since 
the international community came to Afghanistan, they have lots of staff and have spent 
lots of money, but they still can’t bring security.” 
 
-Interview with Wardak community member, April 2010 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
It is hard to overstate the level of Afghan resentment over civilian casualties, or 
detentions, in Afghanistan. A single incident can be enough to spark public protests 
across the country.1  A few months after taking command of U.S. and NATO forces in 
Afghanistan in mid-2009, General Stanley McChrystal told the news program 60 
Minutes, “[T]his civilian casualty issue is much more important than I’d even realized. It 
is literally how we lose the war, or in many ways, how we win it.”2  
 
While Western officials have recognized that civilian casualties, detention, and other 
issues have created blowback that is harmful to their overall mission,3 they often fail to 
understand why these issues have had such an impact, or the larger ramifications in terms 
of how these incidents shape basic Afghan narratives of the conflict. This often leads 
them to treat the symptoms, but not the underlying problems. Beyond the immediate 
anger and resentment that incidents of civilian harm can generate in affected 
communities, nine years of repeated incidents and little in the means of accountability or 
transparency to address them have snowballed into a growing feeling of distrust between 
Afghans and the international community.  Instead of seeing them as stabilizing and 
beneficial actors in Afghanistan, Afghan communities increasingly voice concerns that 
international military are equally responsible for civilian harm and in many cases suspect 
that they are deliberately fueling the conflict. 
 
Unless fully appreciated—and addressed—these negative perceptions have the potential 
to derail critical elements of the international community’s military and political strategy 
in Afghanistan. From reconciliation and reintegration to counterinsurgency to building 
good governance, the current strategies depend heavily on the trust and buy-in of Afghan 
communities.  
 
 
II.  Methodology 
 
In late 2009 and 2010, the Open Society Foundations, in cooperation with local Afghan 
civil society organizations, including the Afghan Development Association, the 
Community Health Association4, The Liaison Office, and the Welfare Association for the 
Development of Afghanistan, conducted research to understand Afghan perceptions 
about warring parties to the conflict.  
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Over 250 Afghans participated in focus groups or individual interviews across Kabul and 
in six provinces: Herat, Khandahar, Khost, Nangarhar, Paktia, and Wardak. Participants 
were primarily male, although women from Kabul, Kandahar, Khost, Nangarhar, Paktia, 
and Herat were also interviewed. In addition to this research, the authors consulted with 
independent human rights monitors, researchers, and community representatives who 
have examined similar issues in other parts of the country, for example, in Kunduz, 
Logar, and Uruzgan provinces.  
 
The interviews were conducted by both international and Afghan teams to see whether 
respondents answered differently when questioned by an international person. There were 
no significant differences. Nonetheless, there may be an overall bias to questions from 
outsiders, as with any survey in Afghanistan. In addition, many interviewed were from 
provinces in which conflict is prevalent, and insurgents have a significant presence. 
Attempts were made to conduct all interviews in private, safe locations to ensure that 
participants felt secure. Despite these precautions, fear of later retaliation may have 
biased some responses. It is significant to note, however, that the responses of those in 
more Taliban-influenced provinces, for example, Kandahar, varied little from provinces 
where there is less of an insurgent influence, for example Herat, suggesting that fear of 
retaliation did not have a significant impact.  
 
We also asked interviewees a range of other questions about the conduct of Afghan 
security forces, militia groups, other forms of foreign engagement in Afghanistan, and 
reconciliation. For the purposes of a more focused analysis and policy recommendations, 
however, this policy brief focuses primarily on answers related to the conduct of 
international forces and insurgent groups. 
 
 
III.  What Afghans Say about the West 
 
Western public perceptions about the causes of instability in Afghanistan and the role of 
international forces and insurgents could be characterized as follows:  1) Insurgents treat 
the civilian population far worse than disciplined and professional international forces; 
insurgents are brutal in their intimidation and harassment of the population. 2) Insurgents 
are, quantitatively and qualitatively, more responsible than international forces for 
civilian harm and escalating the conflict.    
 
These baseline assumptions are not, however, shared by most Afghans. .Most Afghans 
we spoke with believed the opposite to be true. They blamed insurgents for many attacks 
against civilians and other misconduct, but they did not think the international military 
had a much better record than insurgents, citing continued insecurity, detention abuses, 
airstrikes that killed civilians, and night raids that offended entire communities. Many 
Afghans also thought that international forces were, in some cases, colluding with 
insurgents to prolong the conflict. Many Western military officials and policymakers 
often disregard these criticisms as the result of propaganda or poor analysis. But, when 
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the conflict is seen from the perspective of Afghans, these perceptions become 
understandable.    
 
Perceptions of Misconduct and Civilian Harm 
Though international forces have been responsible for significant civilian harm, many 
independent monitors attribute a greater share of casualties to insurgent groups. 
According to UN statistics, insurgents were responsible for 76 percent of civilian 
casualties in the first half of 2010, compared to 12 percent by international forces.5 
Insurgents including the Taliban have conducted widespread targeted assassinations,6 
beheadings,7 executions of women and minors,8  public stonings,9 torture and 
disfigurement,10 and other potential war crimes.11 Faced with evidence of such brutality, 
many Western policymakers question why Afghans protest international military 
operations, but often have little to no response to the more widespread insurgent bomb 
attacks, kidnappings, or targeted assassinations.  
 
Whereas the Western public and policymakers tend to assume that the conduct of 
professional and disciplined Western forces is far better than that of insurgents, most 
Afghans we spoke with viewed them on par, contributing to the perception that 
international forces are equally, if not more to blame than insurgents, for civilian 
casualties.12 Afghans recognized the violent nature of insurgent groups, describing 
suicide bombings, kidnappings, and other acts of violence. But they also recounted 
repeated instances of international forces causing civilian casualties and angering local 
communities through airstrikes, night raids, detention operations, and checkpoint and 
convoy shootings – many of which have been documented by the media and independent 
rights monitors.13 
 
These legitimate grievances, which sometimes are combined with a mistrust of 
foreigners, insurgent propaganda, or pro-Taliban sympathies among some tribes or 
ethnicities have come to generate negative perceptions about international forces. As one 
man from southern Afghanistan explained, “The Taliban’s actions against common 
people are very bad. But the international military forces’ behavior and actions against 
the common people are the same, and are actually worse than the Taliban. For example, 
they killed many innocent people in night raids.”14 Another noted, “If even one Taliban 
enters the village, then Americans bomb the entire village. Due to their bombings, the 
entire population of the village is harmed.”15 Another community elder from Kandahar 
province who had seen many in his village detained said similarly, “When they are 
arresting one insurgent, they are killing more than 10 civilians.”16 Other Afghans 
described international soldiers as people who have shot unarmed men in front of their 
families, took away injured women in helicopters to then only return with their dead 
bodies, and allowed dogs to attack families or corpses.17  
 
Many Afghans also said international forces do not act in accordance with Afghan culture 
and religion, which sharpened their anger. For example, many objected to the common 
practice of night raids, in which typically a joint group of international and Afghan forces 
enter homes at night to kill or capture suspected insurgents.18 Forcibly entering the home 
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at night, and searching women of the family, are outrageous acts according to Afghan 
culture. From the Afghan perspective, it puts the forces on par with thieves or criminals. 
 
Repeated incidents of harm with little explanation or accountability have led a wide 
segment of the Afghan population to believe that international forces do not care for them 
and, in some cases, kill large numbers of civilians intentionally. “They don’t care about 
Afghan people. They slaughter Afghan people like they would kill an animal,” a man 
from Kandahar complained.19 
 
Afghan perceptions of international forces as equally bad, or worse, than insurgents were 
expressed by people from conflict-prone areas and by those living in more stable 
provinces, including those that are historically less sympathetic to the Taliban and less 
susceptible to their propaganda. An English language student from the relatively stable 
province of western Herat fiercely criticized the Taliban’s violence but went on to state 
that international forces were also responsible for some of the worst wartime behavior, 
including indiscriminately firing on civilians, burning the Koran, and harassing locals on 
a daily basis.20  In a focus group discussion in Kabul, participants working for Western-
oriented nongovernmental organizations said they knew of a case in which international 
forces shot a baby in its bed at point-blank range during a night raid.21  A business 
owner, from Herat province said, “International military broke into a house in Helmand 
and killed a child in the house and beat the members of the family without having any 
cause, or even asking what happene 22  d.”   
 
 International Forces’ Assist Insurgents and Prolong the Conflict 
A second reason that Afghan communities place more blame on international forces than 
statistics might suggest is that they often hold international forces responsible for both 
their own acts and for some insurgent attacks. The majority of civilians we interviewed 
believed that international forces were directly or indirectly aiding insurgents to some 
degree. Some thought international forces were actively perpetrating attacks on civilians 
and blaming them on insurgents.23  
 
Many Afghans shared stories of international forces giving or leaving arms or 
ammunition for insurgents. As one man from a village near Kandahar City said, “The 
international troops are the source of illegal activities. Narcotics smuggling, bombing, 
suicide attacks, everything goes back to international military forces. They are also 
instigating fighting between tribes.”24 A woman in Paktia province told of a rumor that 
“Americans” gave a suicide bomber $50,000 to blow himself up during the election 
period.  
 
Stories about international forces laying improvised explosive devices in the roads or 
bazaars are common. A typical example of this narrative was shared by a man from 
Khost: 
 
In Mohammad Agha District of Logar Province, at night a car full of wood 
overturned and the American forces surrounded the area for the whole 
night and in the morning they left the area. When all the civilians gathered 
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near the car, suddenly the car exploded and over 100 people lost their lives 
there. The explosion was done intentionally by the Americans 
themselves.25 
 
In August 2009, a Taliban suicide attack went astray and hit a seemingly random civilian 
site, killing 40 people.  Because the attack seemed to have no particular target, the 
majority of Kandaharis we spoke with assumed the explosion must have been caused by 
an airstrike, not an insurgent bomb, which often attack Afghan government, international 
military, or other international targets.26 The Taliban’s public denial of the attack 
reinforced this belief. Many interviewees said the Taliban were only responsible for 
attacks they admitted publicly.27 
 
An English teacher in Herat noted, “Two or three years ago, there weren’t any foreign 
forces in Herat City and the surrounding districts; and the security was better. But now 
they are here and it is worse. The Taliban are, in my view, supported indirectly by the 
international forces.”28 Even Afghan President Hamid Karzai implied that insurgents 
were being flown from the south to the previously stable northern provinces to instigate 
violence.29  
 
Rumors that international forces are supporting insurgent actions reinforce and are 
themselves reinforced by the growing perception that foreign actors, including Western 
governments, are supporting insurgent and intertribal violence, and seeking to occupy 
Afghanistan.  One of the most common responses to questions about which warring party 
was most responsible for civilian harm was that international forces were equally or more 
responsible because they were deliberately failing to prevent the conflict from spreading. 
A woman from Khost explained, “In my opinion, the American forces themselves want 
to create insurgency for their own interest. Because, if there is peace in the country, then 
the people will tell them that there is no need for the international forces to stay in the 
country. That is why they have let the insurgency increase.”30 
 
A man from Herat similarly stated, “International forces cause all these security issues so 
that they have an excuse to stay here for a long time. If they kick out the Taliban or solve 
the security problem, then the Afghan people will tell them they can go; that they don’t 
need them any more. The suicide bombers and everything that’s happening can all be 
traced back to international forces.”31 
 
The U.S. and its NATO allies were not the only foreign powers suspected of fanning the 
conflict for their own strategic motivations. When asked who supported insurgent 
activities and insurgent groups, the most common response by far was Pakistan, and more 
specifically, the Pakistani intelligence service.32 A number of interviewees also pointed 
to Afghanistan’s other neighbor, Iran.33 The high levels of mistrust of these regional 
powers, and the strong U.S. support for Pakistan often exacerbated Afghan suspicions 
about the intentions of U.S. or international forces. “Pakistan and the American and 
British intelligence help insurgents, give them weapons, money, and other support. They 
don’t want to bring security to the area. They want to work, fight, bring the people for 
their benefits. They want to stay for a long time against their enemies in the area.”34 
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These views should not be pushed aside as irrational—no matter how unbelievable they 
seem to Westerners. What matters is that Afghans believe them, the beliefs are 
widespread, and the beliefs impact the way Afghans perceive and interact with the 
international community. Further, as the next section will discuss, once seen from their 
perspective, it is not impossible to understand why Afghans might believe that 
international forces are colluding with insurgents. 
  
 
IV. Where these Perceptions Come From 
 
In contrast to widespread insurgent abuses, which include suicide attacks that kill 
civilians, kidnappings, acid attacks, and other forms of intimidation, international military 
forces in Afghanistan were responsible for only 12 percent of civilian casualties in the 
first half of 2010. Yet, Afghan civilians we spoke with said international forces are 
equally responsible for civilians casualties and harm to civilians. Many suspected 
international forces of planting mines, supporting suicide attackers, or directly supporting 
insurgent forces in other ways. A large number of interviewees also stated that 
international forces and foreign governments involved in Afghanistan are deliberately 
fomenting conflict for their own strategic motivations.  
 
Many policymakers regard these accounts as ludicrous and dismiss them out of hand. 
This is a mistake. While the details or facts of any given story or narrative may not be 
accurate many of the overall suppositions that Afghan communities make about 
international forces are not irrational given the conduct they have observed over the last 
nine years, and the lack of accountability of the international military following 
allegations of misconduct. 
 
Afghan community perceptions that international forces have been abusive and 
responsible for civilian casualties are accurate, even if specific stories or theories of harm 
have been exaggerated or incorrect. International forces engaged in Afghanistan have 
been involved in many cases of abuse, misconduct, and preventable mistakes over the last 
nine years. Examples include: 
 
• Five U.S. soldiers stand charged with forming a “death squad” in 2010 that 
intentionally killed and then dismembered Afghan civilians, keeping some of the 
bones and skulls as trophies.35   
• In April 2010, international forces engaged in a night raid shot an elderly man in 
his bed.36  
• In August 2009, international forces forcibly entered a Western medical clinic in 
Wardak province, tied up local staff and some patients’ family members, and 
ordered patients out of their wards before searching the premises.37  
• During an incident in Kandahar in 2007, international forces broke into the homes 
of two UN translators at night, booby trapped them to explosives, destroyed or 
damaged several thousand dollars in property, and later took the men to an 
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undisclosed base where they were held overnight, questioned, and subjected to 
harsh treatment.38  
• In March 2007, U.S. Marines in eastern Afghanistan responded to a suicide attack 
that wounded one of their men by firing on all civilian vehicles in sight, killing 19 
and wounding many others.39   
 
While in most cases, the military has justified its actions under the laws of war and as 
self-defense, these retorts do little to ease the anger of Afghans.  
 
Detention operations have been equally destructive to the image of international forces.40 
U.S. soldiers in particular have detained people without giving them any meaningful way 
to challenge the allegations against them—leading to a system of de facto indefinite 
detention.41 Detainees were also held in conditions of confinement well below 
international standards, and exposed to mistreatment that caused at least two detainees to 
die.42 Afghans have made allegations throughout the war of soldiers at the point of 
capture beating them while handcuffed and destroying their personal property for no 
good reason.43 Many of these abuses confirmed for Afghans the pre-existing perceptions 
they had about U.S. detention operations based on media reports about abuses at Abu 
Ghraib in Iraq and in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  
 
These incidents of harm toward Afghan civilians undergird Afghans’ negative 
perceptions of international forces. A former detainee held at the U.S. Bagram Theater 
Internment Facility who was arrested with his brother in a 2009 night raid explained, “I 
thought the U.S. had come to build our country and to help our people. But my brother 
was a principal at a school; and I was a farmer. And what was the fault of the women and 
children who were in the house when it was raided and destroyed? I went to open the gate 
for them and they shot at me. Why are people being arrested for no reason?”44 
 
The man’s uncle summed up the sentiments that many Afghans feel:  
 
The U.S. slogans are different from what they’re actually doing. They 
came to develop the country and destroy Al Qaeda, not to arrest innocent 
people. The U.S. is creating a distance between themselves and Afghans. 
People would gather around the U.S. when they first came to the district. 
Now we hate them and don’t talk to them. Even when they give out small 
things like candy to children, the children throw it back. The trust has been 
destroyed.45 
 
Four other elements have exacerbated the negative effects of these incidents, and also 
contributed toward broader conspiracy theories: 1) a failure by international forces to 
acknowledge or publicly hold themselves accountable for their mistakes; 2) the higher 
expectations that Afghans have of international forces’ conduct; 3) the fact that Afghans 
do not see the insurgency as a homogenous group; and 4) an accumulation of well-
founded doubts and disappointments over the past nine years. 
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When incidents of civilian casualties, detainee abuse, and mistaken arrest occur there 
have been few public investigations or other attempts to demonstrate accountability to 
affected communities, creating a vacuum for many of the details of these incidents to be 
exaggerated, or for baseless stories to spread.46 For most of the last nine years, the 
international military response to allegations of harm typically ranged from ignoring the 
charges to denying them. As one man from a village near Kandahar City noted, 
“[International forces] can do anything they want and no one has to explain why they did 
these bad things.”47 Another man from the same area said, “Any time the international 
military forces kill people they say ‘please forgive us.’ Then the day after they do the 
same thing.”48  
 
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings Philip Alston noted after a visit to 
Afghanistan in 2008 that in most cases it was virtually impossible for average Afghans to 
get even basic answers about what happened to a detained loved one.49 The few public 
findings that have been released came only after extensive public pressure, and even then 
they have been cursory and lacked transparency into the methodology of the 
investigation. For example, when the United States was accused of killing around 90 
civilians in a bombing raid in August 2008 in Shindand, it rejected the accusations, 
saying only five to seven civilians were killed. After intense public pressure and 
condemnation, a military investigation found that at least 33 civilians were killed.50  
 
But even when investigations, prosecutions, convictions, and disciplinary actions for 
misconduct have taken place, the military often does not communicate the outcomes to 
affected communities, such that most Afghans believe that international forces are never 
held accountable.51  A United Nations report on the protection of civilians noted that it 
“documented only a few cases in which the results of investigations have been partly 
published,” and the “[v]ictims and affected communities were often not informed 
whether disciplinary or other action had been taken against those who may have been 
responsible for civilian casualties including commanders.”52 In addition, independent 
monitors have noted that where investigation does take place, the resulting disciplinary 
actions are often too light for the conduct involved.53  
 
Another important factor influencing how Afghans view these incidents is that Afghans 
have higher standards of behavior for a military with precision force capabilities and an 
established status as a professional and advanced military. In the initial U.S. invasion in 
2001, U.S. airstrikes relied on military technology that awed Afghans who had been 
exposed to 20 years of indiscriminate and blunt force.  The accuracy of these initial 
strikes and subsequent stories about the surveillance and targeting capabilities of 
unmanned drones nurtured a now commonly held belief that international forces have 
endless capabilities to recognize their enemies from afar and target them with precision.  
 
With these expectations in place, Afghans became more outraged when international 
forces caused civilian casualties than when the technologically inferior insurgents did. A 
man from Khost explained, “These Americans … claim to be able to see something from 
the sky even if it is six inches long. So how could they not see the Taliban, and instead of 
bombing them, bomb the innocent civilians?”54 
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When a man from Kandahar was asked whom he blamed for civilian casualties, he 
explained, “Most of the responsibility belongs to international forces because they have 
all the equipment, support, training, command structure, and facilities that they need. And 
yet so many casualties happen.”55 
 
Analyst Antonio Giustozzi has suggested that malign views of international forces and 
conspiracy theories about foreign intentions in Afghanistan began to dramatically 
increase from 2006 onwards due to the contrast between the high expectations that 
Afghans had of international forces’ power and their inability to stop the Taliban from 
creating instability on the ground: 
 
In particular, the fighting around Kandahar that October (the battle of Pashmul), 
despite being a tactical defeat of the Taliban, conveyed the message to the Afghan 
population that the Taliban were able to challenge an alliance of the world’s most 
powerful armies (United States, Britain and Canada) in a conventional battle near 
one of Afghanistan’s main cities. That convinced many Afghans that something 
was wrong in the official account of the conflict as given by the Americans.56 
 
Because of international forces’ higher capabilities and promises of protection, many 
interviewees also blamed them for the harm they failed to stop. Afghans expected 
international forces’ superior technology and discipline to protect them from insurgent 
abuses. When they did not, it often led them to suspect international forces of bad 
intentions. One woman from Paktia province said she thought that international forces 
could bring peace and security to the country if they really wanted to: “They got rid of 
the Taliban in three days so why can’t they stop the insurgents from taking over a single 
village or district.”57 The fact that they did not, she suggested, meant that they simply did 
not care about Afghans.  
 
A mullah from Herat province noted, “Gradually the Taliban are working their way back 
into Afghanistan and the international forces seem to be doing nothing about it. In 2001, 
international forces were not even in Afghanistan but when the United States wanted to 
kick out the Taliban, they did so in a very short time. International forces are everywhere 
in Afghanistan now. The Taliban are right in front of them, and they do nothing.” He 
gave the specific example of an incident in which a bus he was traveling in was held up at 
a Taliban checkpoint. “The place where the Taliban inspected the bus was only four 
kilometers from a main highway. Do they not know about this? Or do they just not 
care?”58 
 
In contrast to the high expectations Afghans placed on the foreign military, they place 
low expectations on insurgents. For example, when asked about the harm caused by 
insurgent attacks several respondents said that insurgents “had to” use suicide bombings 
or roadside bombs because it was the only way they could respond to international 
forces.59 A study by the International Crisis Group on insurgent propaganda suggested 
the Taliban has sometimes used their perceived weaknesses to deflect public anger and 
excuse insurgent attacks that resulted in a high civilian death toll.60  
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Afghan civilians also have different perceptions of international forces than the Western 
public and policymakers because they tend to distinguish between insurgent groups. 
When discussing examples of civilian casualties caused by insurgents, interviewees 
frequently attributed responsibility to a specific insurgent group—for example the 
Taliban, Hesb-i-Islami, or Al Qaeda—rather than generically blaming “insurgents” for 
the attack.  Many Afghans do not see the war as a two-party conflict—international and 
Afghan forces versus insurgents. Instead, they attributed blame for civilian casualties to a 
specific group or even individual.   
 
In this context, many Afghans are comparing international forces to each faction of 
insurgents, not insurgents as a whole. This may help explain why Afghans assign 
relatively more blame to international forces than Western observers might. For example, 
the UN 2010 mid-year analysis attributed 76 percent of civilian casualties to insurgents, 
and 12 percent to pro-government (primarily international) forces. Statistics like this form 
a basis of Western perceptions that international forces cause far less harm. However, if 
the statistics about insurgent attacks were broken down by insurgent group—for example, 
if 20 percent of attacks were caused by one group, 15 percent by another group, and so 
on—then international forces might appear to be as responsible as other key warring 
parties for a significant portion of civilian harm. 
 
The more complex Afghan perceptions about international forces to explain are those 
alleging that international forces are planting mines, supporting insurgents, and otherwise 
instigating conflict. Yet even these “conspiracy theories” may have roots in actual 
Western policy, and thus are worth closer examination. Years of civilian casualties, 
arbitrary detention, and misconduct by international forces, and the fact that the conduct 
of international forces is judged against higher standards than those applied to the 
insurgents, have contributed toward Afghan perceptions of international forces that are 
harsher than one might expect given the worse record of insurgent groups. These 
legitimate grievances, fed by propaganda and unchecked by meaningful accountability by 
international forces, have simmered for nine years. Afghan citizens’ mistrust of 
international forces is now so great that they are willing to believe stories about 
international forces supporting the insurgency or instigating conflict.  
 
Though many of these claims are baseless, some Western policies have helped buttress 
allegations that international forces or other foreign powers are providing support to the 
insurgents. For example, when asked why they believed that international forces might be 
giving arms or support to the insurgents they are supposed to be fighting, Afghans often 
point to Western support of Pakistan, whom they suspect of supporting insurgents. The 
United States and other foreign donors have increasingly supported Pakistan since the 
engagement in Afghanistan began, and Afghan civilians continue to suspect that there is 
some Pakistani government involvement in Taliban support. Few Western commentators 
or policymakers would make the next leap in logic that the international community was 
knowingly supporting the Taliban and other insurgents via Pakistan, but given Afghan 
assumptions of Western military omnipotence and mistrust of regional power plays it is 
not irrational to think that they might conclude this.  
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There may also be some basis for Afghan community accounts that the international 
military or members of foreign governments or the international community have 
sometimes passed weapons or support onto insurgent groups, albeit not knowingly. For 
example, it has been estimated that as much as 20 percent of funds from major 
development contracts fall into the hands of local insurgent groups as protection bribes, 
an allegation taken seriously enough to initiate a USAID probe into contracting 
practices.61 The Times of London, Al Jazeera, and other media have also reported 
instances of international forces paying bribes to local Taliban commanders to avoid 
attack.62 More broadly, over the past several years some foreign military and intelligence 
units have supported various local defense initiatives, public protection forces, election 
militias, tribal groups, and other ad hoc groups in an attempt to support stability in 
particular provinces or areas.63 Most of these initiatives were well intentioned, but they 
ultimately ended up empowering unaccountable groups and individuals, some of whom 
might have had past or active affiliations with insurgent groups. All this serves to 
reinforce Afghan suspicions that international forces are colluding with insurgents. 
 
Considering the legitimate grievances sparked by harsh international military tactics, the 
lack of accountability, and the growing strength of insurgents despite seeming 
international military omnipotence, the narratives that are often dismissed as blatant 
propaganda or unfounded conspiracy theories do not appear so extraordinary. The 
willingness of Afghans to believe in a strategy of Western occupation and malign 
intentions result from an accumulation of well-founded doubts and disappointments over 
the years, as well as a strong dose of insurgent propaganda. Many may be factually 
wrong, or be the result of mistaken conclusions, but the policy take-away should be that 
better communication and trust-building to address these false premises is needed, not to 
simply dismiss them out of hand. 
 
 
V.  Why the West Doesn’t Listen 
 
Western officials often disregard Afghan accounts of international forces harming 
civilians deliberately or supporting insurgent activities as conspiracy theories or rumors. 
They dismiss them as products of ethnic or tribal bias against the Afghan government or 
the international community, general Afghan bias against foreign invaders, or the product 
of insurgent propaganda and a lack of access to credible information. Though all these 
factors hold some sway in how Afghans view the West, interviews conducted by the 
Open Society Foundations and their partners suggest that these factors do not have as 
much to do with Afghan perceptions as the actual policies and conduct of international 
actors in Afghanistan over the last nine years.  
 
Western policymakers often suggest that stories about outrageous conduct of 
international forces or Western ulterior motives in Afghanistan are shared only by 
Afghans who supported or continue to support the Taliban movement, or who bear a 
grudge against those currently in power. But this is a simplified understanding of the 
problem. While tribal disenfranchisement or sympathy with Taliban ideology is an 
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important factor behind some Afghan perceptions, they are not the only ones. Of those 
we interviewed, those who were staunchly pro-government, or who were most opposed to 
the Taliban movement—for example female human rights activists, educated, 
nongovernmental organization partners, and even governmental staff—often voiced some 
of the same suspicions and criticisms of international forces as those from areas that are 
more supportive of the Taliban. Harsh views of international forces were not limited to 
certain ethnicities or tribes, or to Taliban supporters. The negative perceptions 
documented in our research are widespread, with varying degrees of buy-in across 
political, tribal, or ethnic lines. 
 
Western policymakers also dismiss the legitimacy of negative perceptions because, they 
say, Afghans will always mistrust foreign “occupiers.” Afghanistan’s historical suspicion, 
rightfully, of foreign armies certainly creates a powerful bias. For example, a man from 
Nangarhar province explained that many Afghans believe the United States is providing 
support to insurgents through its military aid packages to Pakistan just as it covertly 
supported Pakistan to provide a safe haven, training, and weapons to the mujahedeen 
militias fighting in Afghanistan in the 1980s.64  
 
While Afghans may always have some degree of mistrust of foreign troops, the levels of 
disillusionment and resentment present today are at an all-time high. Animosity toward 
the Western presence and intentions was not as widespread in the first few years after the 
U.S. invasion, and many Afghans welcomed foreign troops and foreign influence, 
according to researchers and journalists there at the time. The change in attitudes in the 
last nine years suggests that current levels of hostility have more to do with the recent 
conduct of international forces and the ineffectiveness of post-2001 Western involvement 
in Afghanistan, than with Afghans’ historical mistrust of foreigners. 
 
Finally, many Western policy makers and military professionals believe that negative 
narratives are generated primarily by intimidation and propaganda, and that they 
therefore should have little bearing on policy beyond strategic communications 
initiatives. Insurgents often are better at getting their story out first.65 Successful 
insurgent propaganda can dissemble responsibility or mute public anger over insurgent 
attacks that kill civilians.66 Propaganda has a powerful influence on Afghans, amplified 
by the fact that until very recently international forces did little in the way of 
transparency or public relations to communicate or be sensitive to Afghan viewpoints. In 
addition, the spread of propaganda may be facilitated by insurgent intimidation.67 Afghan 
communities or individuals may be too afraid to speak out publicly about insurgent 
abuses, either to their own communities or to those documenting civilian harm and 
causes. 
 
Propaganda and intimidation must be factored into assessing the validity of any one 
account. Some Afghan we interviewed made this distinction and attributed the negative 
stories they had heard about international forces to propaganda.68 Yet it is hard to blame 
such strong discrepancies on insurgent intimidation and public relations alone.69 Many 
Afghans may be illiterate, but that does not make them uninformed. Radio coverage is 
wide and Afghans listen. It was not uncommon for illiterate, rural Afghan women to be 
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able to recite a litany of very real airstrikes, night raids, and detention operations that 
caused civilian harm. Many recited back to us the promises of former General Stanley 
McChrystal or President Obama to improve stability and reduce civilian harm, and made 
cogent arguments backed with examples of how these promises had not materialized.  
 
The fact that some of this information may be spread by insurgents for strategic purposes 
does not negate the fact that the propaganda may reflect real and accurate grievances. A 
report by the International Crisis Group that analyzed the spread and impact of insurgent 
propaganda in Afghanistan noted that unaddressed past human rights abuses and the 
“high-handed tactics” of international forces were “the starting point from which the 
Taliban began its outreach, feeding on local grievances.…”70 It recommended that the 
best way to address insurgent propaganda would be to alter policies to address the 
underlying grievances that propaganda depends upon.71   
 
While propaganda and inherent Afghan mistrust of foreigners are reasons for Western 
policymakers to take Afghan accounts of Western behavior with a grain of salt, they are 
not a reason to disregard Afghan views altogether. Even the most outlandish conspiracy 
theories or negative perceptions may have elements of truth to them, and may offer 
insights into the growing Afghan mistrust and disillusionment with foreign engagement 
in Afghanistan. As the next section will discuss, such insights are crucial for key Western 
policies in Afghanistan to succeed. 
 
 
VI.  Why these Perceptions Matter and How to Address Them 
 
The U.S. and NATO military counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan is premised on 
denying insurgents the support of the population. The end result should be that local 
communities turn on insurgents and the tide of the war changes. But this will be difficult 
to accomplish when international forces themselves are starting from such a base of 
mistrust and resentment with the Afghan people. Current efforts to address this problem, 
though in the right direction, have often been either superficial or only half-steps. 
Western policies must take into account not only the direct but also the indirect effects of 
troop behavior and take more meaningful measures toward accountability.  
 
The idea that civilian casualties, detention operations, and other abuses of power have 
bred extreme Afghan hostility toward the international coalition and the Afghan 
government is not new. The counterinsurgency strategy (COIN) that was put in place in 
the summer of 2009 to reverse dwindling popular Afghan support prioritized reducing 
civilian harm and offending behavior for precisely these reasons.72 Immediately upon 
taking command of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan in July 2009, now former 
General Stanley McChrystal issued policies limiting troop tactics like airstrikes and night 
raids that Afghan communities had long objected to.73 International forces reached out 
more to Afghan communities and civil society, and began to publicly recognize and 
apologize for civilian deaths, albeit with some continued foot-dragging on investigations. 
Parallel efforts by U.S. military and civilian officials improved oversight, transparency, 
and reduced the risk of mistreatment at U.S. detention facilities in Afghanistan.74 These 
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strategies were largely kept in place when General McChrystal was succeeded by another 
COIN proponent, General David Petraeus, in July 2010.75 
 
Despite these significant policy reforms, 2010 has not seen the reversal in momentum for 
the insurgency that the COIN strategy envisaged.  Though international forces have 
reduced the number of civilian killed by their soldiers and actions in the last year,76 
Afghans still hold them as much to blame for civilian casualties.  One reason for the 
lingering hostility is that with such an accumulation of mistrust it will take time for 
Afghan perceptions to change. Too many Afghans are upset about the past nine years.  
 
Further, limited attention given to understanding the full impact of Afghan narratives of 
the conflict has led policymakers to make only superficial changes to practices that have 
been highly objectionable to Afghan communities, and in some cases to continue past 
practices that have negative consequences for the overall strategy. Though the conduct of 
international forces has improved, civilian casualties, night raids, and abusive detention 
operations have not stopped. To the contrary, there are some indications that 
inflammatory practices, such as night raids, have continued apace or even increased.77 
This is particularly true for covert military, intelligence, and detention operations that 
seemingly act outside the counterinsurgency strategy.  
 
Past attempts by international forces to form local irregular militias have also empowered 
warlords and criminal groups; led to incidents of mistreatment, serious human rights 
abuses and corruption, including extortion; and, in some cases, led to international 
community resources being diverted to insurgents or supporters of insurgents.78 Despite 
the fact that these consequences continue to fuel mistrust and disillusionment among the 
population, and thus undermine the broader COIN strategy, Special Forces continue to 
engage in such activities, the latest inception being the Afghan Local Police.79 Until such 
policies are stopped or drastically reformed, such that all such militia groups are subject 
to meaningful accountability, Afghans will likely continue to look at other Western trust-
building measures with skepticism. 
 
Concerns about conduct are further exacerbated by the continued weakness of 
transparency and accountability measures, particularly with regard to Special Forces and 
nonmilitary forces. Since 2008, International Assistance Security Force (ISAF) 
headquarters and other troop contributing nations have increased efforts toward strategic 
communications, public announcements, and press releases.80 There is also an increased 
emphasis on goodwill gestures to Afghan communities—encouraging troops to discuss 
issues with elders through local shuras, translating more mission titles, slogans, or terms 
into locally spoken languages, and reinforcing courtesy gestures like respectful driving in 
public areas. Monetary compensation and immediate public apologies were more 
frequent in 2009 and 2010 than in the past.81 
 
These public relations strategies and goodwill measures, however, have not done enough 
to answer Afghan demands for meaningful accountability. Allegations of civilian 
casualties and calls for investigation are still too often met initially with denial and 
obstruction. In September 2009, Germany forces called in a U.S. air strike on two 
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disabled tankers in Kunduz that had been hijacked by insurgents. Civilians had gathered 
around the tanker by the time the air strike took place, resulting in over 70 civilian deaths. 
Initially, German military officials denied the extent of the civilian damage, which led to 
resignations after the full toll of civilian casualties was revealed.82  
 
To date, it seems that media reports are what spark robust investigations and uncover 
abuses rather than internal oversight mechanisms. In February 2010, U.S. Special Forces 
conducted a night raid that killed five civilians, which included three women, two of 
whom were pregnant.83  An ISAF press release initially suggested the women died prior 
to the raid through an “honour killing.”84 A full internal investigation was only triggered 
weeks later when a journalist interviewed the families and reported that the women had 
been killed by international forces. After initially denying the journalist’s account, ISAF 
later issued another press release that apologized for the denial, accepted responsibility, 
and offered paid compensation for the women’s deaths.85 An investigation was 
conducted, both on the incident and on the cover-up; however, the findings of this 
investigation were not immediately released despite repeated requests from independent 
monitors. Researchers from the Open Society Foundations have recently been informed 
that a Freedom of Information Act request regarding this investigation will be honored, 
and a redacted version will be released.  
 
Public and individual accountability (for both international and Afghan security forces), 
for past and present abuses and lesser missteps is needed. Providing meaningful 
accountability could be a game changer, both to soften Afghan perceptions of 
international military forces and to better ensure that misconduct is not repeated. It also 
allows the international community to lead by example. For long-term stability, 
Afghanistan needs strong rule of law, rights protection, and a functioning government.  
While many international aid projects attempt to target these sectors at a micro level, 
Afghan officials often tell local and international rights monitors that the international 
community needs to “Get your own house in order first.” 
 
Finally, as discussed above, Afghans blame international forces for civilian casualties not 
only because of the harm their troops cause, but also for a failure to protect civilians from 
insurgent attacks. A key element of the current COIN strategy is to increase troop 
numbers so that they have more of a presence in key population areas, to protect the 
population, and to undermine local support for insurgents.86 While the idea of population 
protection is good in theory, in many contested areas, the presence of international troops 
has increased the risk to civilians without any corresponding increase in protection from 
insurgent suicide attacks, improvised explosive devices, assassinations, or retaliation.87 
Civilians do not interpret such movements as benevolent population protection, but 
instead as further examples of international forces’ indifference to their suffering. 
 
 
VII.  Recommendations 
 
After 30 years of war, Afghans are not willing to ignore the consequences of conflict for 
their communities. This is part of the reason that civilian casualty issues have such a 
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significant impact on Afghan attitudes about the present conflict. A transitional justice 
mechanism that acknowledges the suffering of the victims and helps Afghan 
communities address past grievances would play an important role in reconciliation. 
Additionally, an Afghan institution should be charged with creating a public, national 
registry for victims of conflict. Although many Afghan and international entities (civilian 
and military) track civilian casualties, few release any information beyond the casualty 
statistics. A more thorough, public accounting, including the cause of death, and those 
believed to be responsible would help ensure that these losses are not forgotten.88 The 
Afghan institution in charge of this work should have some degree of independence from 
all warring parties, and should maintain significant ties to Afghan communities and civil 
society. 
 
With the international community fighting an uphill battle against Afghan perceptions, 
the following additional recommendations would allow policymakers and military 
officials to make inroads toward establishing the trust and cooperation with Afghans that 
have been lost due to civilian casualties, night raids, detention operations, insecurity, and 
lack of accountability: 
• Recognize the causes and importance of Afghan community narratives, rather 
than dismissing them out of hand as conspiracy theories, propaganda, or tribal 
bias. 
• Institute changes for broader transparency and responsiveness by international 
forces to allegations, both past and present, of misconduct against Afghans. Such 
allegations must be taken seriously, and result in meaningful investigations and 
disciplinary procedures. The results should then be communicated directly to 
affected individuals or communities.  
• Reaffirm and extend the recent military tactical and policy changes that have 
reduced the potential for civilian harm by international troops and continue to 
provide greater protections for those detained in the conflict. 
• Stop the increased use of night raids as the primary kill/capture mechanism. Every 
night raid should be scrutinized prior to its approval as to why it must be 
conducted during the night and why more traditional law enforcement safeguards 
for neutralizing suspects are not appropriate or possible. 
• Exercise greater political accountability over Special Forces and nonmilitary 
forces engaged in night raids and related operations. 
• Reconsider the new counterinsurgency strategy of pushing international troops 
closer to villages, until the population can meaningfully be protected from the 
increased insurgent violence, collateral damage from international forces, and 
broader humanitarian consequences that often accompany such troop movements. 
• Exercise caution regarding initiatives that arm, train, or otherwise empower local 
militias. Past attempts have often resulted in the unintended side effects of 
empowering local warlords, leading to abuses of power, inflaming tribal rivalries, 
indirectly supporting insurgent groups, and otherwise feeding the conflict.  
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VIII.  Conclusion 
 
Failure to understand the impact of Afghan narratives of the conflict has contributed to 
ill-informed policymaking, leading to Western policies that are either not as effective as 
they could be, or worse, inadvertently exacerbating existing problems. So long as these 
perceptions continue to be ignored, Western policies on issues ranging from 
reconciliation, to rehabilitation and reintegration, to civilian protection, to Afghan 
government mentorship will operate based on fundamentally mistaken assumptions about 
how Afghan actors will react to these initiatives. 
 
Sustainable conflict resolution must be brokered from a base of trust, something the 
international military and policy community currently do not have given the record of the 
last nine years. The analysis in this policy brief suggests many local Afghans see the 
international community, particularly the international military, as an entity that they are 
forced to interact with rather than engage with as a trusted partner. This does not 
engender productive or sustainable resolution of differences, but simply a jockeying for 
position among groups prioritizing immediate survival followed by short- to medium-
term power grabs. 
 
Further, many of the issues that have engendered this mistrust will also be important 
grievances for the international community to address during any reconciliation 
discussion, since anger and resentment over civilian casualties and other legitimate 
grievances have pushed many communities into the arms of the Taliban in the past. Many 
interviewees said they had no confidence in proposed reconciliation talks with the 
Taliban because those in the Taliban were often those who were most aggrieved by the 
actions of international forces, and thus they would never reach an amicable solution with 
them.  
 
Admittedly, military actions are only one factor shaping Afghan public opinion about the 
international community’s intentions in Afghanistan. Others include the international 
community’s inability to control rampant corruption, establish sustainable development 
projects, improve weak governance programs, and strengthen an almost nonexistent 
justice system. But civilian casualties, night raids, and detentions remain atop the list of 
factors that Afghans cite when they explain how they view Westerners. If we do not take 
the time to listen, it is hard to imagine how Afghans will ever truly trust the international 
community and see it as a vehicle for moving toward stability rather than conflict. 
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